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Abstract
Countries across the world responded to the COVID-19 pandemic with what might well be
the set of biggest state-led mobility and activity restrictions in the history of humankind. But
how effective were these measures across countries? Compared to multiple recent studies
that document an association between such restrictions and the control of the contagion, we
use an instrumental variable approach to estimate the causal effect of these restrictions on
mobility, and the growth rate of confirmed cases and deaths during the first wave of the pan-
demic. Using the level of stringency in the rest of the world to predict the level of stringency
of the restriction measures in a country, we show while stricter contemporaneous measures
affected mobility, stringency in seven to fourteen days mattered most for containing the con-
tagion. Heterogeneity analysis, by various institutional inequalities, reveals that even though
the restrictions reduced mobility more in relatively less-developed countries, the causal
effect of a reduction in mobility was higher in more developed countries. We propose several
explanations. Our results highlight the need to complement mobility and activity restrictions
with other health and information measures, especially in less-developed countries, to com-
bat the COVID-19 pandemic effectively.
1 Introduction
By December 31, 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic had infected over 90 million people and
claimed almost 2 million lives. Countries across the world have responded with what might
well be the set of biggest state-led mobility and activity restrictions in the history of human-
kind. The hope is to contain the contagion and reduce the congestion in health-care utiliza-
tion. But besides being controversial and costly, such measures may not always be successful in
containing the spread and can, sometimes, worsen the situation (see, among others, [1–10]).
The trade-offs are bigger for developing countries. In the absence of proper social security sup-
port, they face a catch-22 situation where strict mobility and activity restrictions, especially if
ineffective, will unnecessarily increase the economic cost through lost livelihoods and, perhaps,
even compromise the immunity of the vulnerable population. The natural question that then
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follows is whether such measures have been effective in controlling the COVID-19 contagion.
If yes, what institutional factors contribute to their effectiveness?
Multiple recent studies have submitted that there exists a negative association between such
restrictions and the contagion [11–17]. However, much of the work either simulate counter-
factual scenarios or documents association between the restrictions and the contagion. With
studies suggesting a steep economic cost of such restrictions, to be able to design optimal miti-
gation policy for COVID-19 and future pandemics, it is crucial to understand whether, when,
where, and how much do these restrictions causally affect the contagion [18]. Few studies
attempt to identify causal effects of the restrictions using a difference-in-differences (DiD)
design—comparing regions with high and low levels of restrictions [12, 16, 17]. But the restric-
tions were almost always in response to the disease situations in the region. Areas with worse
contagion or more watchful populations might have enacted stringent restrictions relatively
early. Since these factors could have also affected the evolution of the disease scenario, the
assumption of parallel trends underlying the DiD methodology is unlikely to hold.
We propose an instrumental variable approach to estimate the causal effect that the level of
stringency of the restrictions had on human mobility and the growth rate of the contagion. In
deciding whether to impose restrictions, national and local governments took into account not
only the prevailing disease situation in the country (the factor that confounds DiD estimates)
but also what they expected would happen in the future in the presence and absence of such
restrictions. Lacking perfect foresight, they made predictions based on their observations of
the condition in the rest of the world [19]. Governments that witnessed a rapid increase in the
number of COVID-19 cases and subsequent mobility and activity restrictions in the rest of the
world in the days following the first confirmed case in their own country, sprung into action
swiftly and imposed stricter restrictions. It is important to note that enacting strict policy mea-
sures does not necessarily translate to enforcement or compliance, but rather an acknowledg-
ment of the need for stricter restrictions, and possibly an intent. Building on this insight, we
use the day-to-day changes in the stringency of the restrictions in the rest of the world to
instrument how stringent a country’s internal mobility and activity restrictions were.
We conduct our analysis combining high-frequency measures of mobility data from Goo-
gle’s daily mobility reports, country-date-level information on the stringency of restrictions
in response to the pandemic from Oxford’s Coronavirus Government Response Tracker
(OxCGRT), and daily data on people tested, confirmed cases, and deaths attributed to
COVID-19 from Our World In Data and the Johns Hopkins Center for Systems Science and
Engineering (CSSE). Using the instrumental variable technique, we estimate large causal
effects of stricter restrictions on mobility and the weekly growth rate of recorded cases and
deaths attributed to COVID-19. In comparison, we find that more stringent restrictions have
weak marginal effects on the growth rate of tests conducted. Consistent with the current scien-
tific understanding that an infected human can infect another human up to 14 days since
being infected, we see that the level of stringency of the restrictions in the previous two weeks
matters more than the contemporaneous level or level of restrictions 3 weeks in the past (see
Qiu et al. (2020) [15] and the studies they cite for a discussion of the incubation and the infec-
tion period). We also document considerable differences between the correlation and causal
estimates that raise concerns over the use of the association estimates from previous studies to
evaluate the costs and benefits of the restrictions.
Next, we show that the effectiveness of the restrictions varies significantly across countries
as per their institutional capacities. In particular, more stringent measures help more in richer,
more educated, more democratic, and less corrupt countries with older, healthier populations
and more effective governments. Finally, we draw attention to the observation that announc-
ing restrictions does not necessarily imply a reduction in mobility; it depends on the level of
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compliance and enactment of the policies. The estimated reduced-form effects of stringency
on the growth rate of cases and deaths incorporates the differential compliance across coun-
tries. Utilizing a recursive mixed-process model, we show that even though the stricter restric-
tions had a larger negative marginal effect on mobility in relatively less-developed countries,
they were more effective in containing the contagion in more developed countries. However,
as readers will see, while this result is stark when the outcome variable is cases to tests ratio, it
is not as stark for deaths to tests ratio. Consistent with the institutional heterogeneity results,
these results indicate that imposing mobility restrictions is not enough to contain the conta-
gion in developing countries, and the benefits reaped from high stringency are lower relative
to developed nations. The restrictions should be effectively complemented with other policy
measures, such as raising awareness about best practices when these restrictions are imposed,
and health and economic assistance for those affected [20, 21].
The findings have important policy implications. COVID-19 is not the first and will not be
the last epidemic to afflict humanity. Better future preparedness requires a better understand-
ing of when and how to act in times of such crises. Understanding the effectiveness of mobility
and activity restrictions in containing contagions will not only help us optimize our current
response to COVID-19 but also prepare us better to face future disease outbreaks. The institu-
tional heterogeneity analysis suggests that increasing stringency alone might not be enough,
especially in developing countries where labor market conditions, lacking health infrastruc-
ture, and constraints on implementation infrastructure might limit the effectiveness of these
restrictions. Since the economic downturn can negatively affect the health and welfare out-
comes in poorer countries more than in rich countries where the transition into work from
home is relatively easier, this raises serious concerns about the cost-effectiveness of stringent
mobility and activity restrictions in the absence of complementary policies. The results call for
a country-specific policy response suited to the institutional capacity and socio-economic cir-
cumstances of the country.
2 Data and empirical specification
2.1 Data and summary statistics
For our analyses, we collate and link country-level daily data from the following sources:
2.1.1 Google community mobility reports. To facilitate better monitoring and compli-
ance to the nationwide and local lockdown decisions and social-distancing requirements to
reduce the transmission of the COVID-19 contagion, Google has released publicly daily aggre-
gated data on changes in mobility across six key high-level location categories in 131 countries.
The mobility measures reflect how busy these places are. The six location categories are grocer-
ies and pharmacies, retail and recreation sites, parks, transit stations, workplaces, and resi-
dences. We source the mobility data from these reports from the 15th of February to the 30th
of July reflecting daily percentage changes in reference to a baseline. The baseline is the median
value of mobility for the corresponding day of the week during the 5 weeks of January 3, 2020,
to February 6, 2020. These measures of changes in mobility across the six location categories
serve as our first set of outcome variables.
While a reasonable measure of the extent of compliance to the restrictions, or successful
enactment of the policies, the data comes with certain caveats. The reports are generated using
a technology similar to the real-time anonymized Google Maps traffic data, and as such are
reflective of only those users who have their location history setting turned on in their (cell-
phone, tablet, etc.) Google account [22]. Therefore, while the data is impressive, it is not
representative of the population at large. Another important aspect to note is that while the
residential category shows the relative change in daily time spent at home, the other measures
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reflect respective daily relative changes in the number of individual visits. So, the residential
category carries a different unit of measurement than the other categories and thus should be
interpreted as such.
2.1.2 Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker (OxCGRT). OxCGRT pro-
vides a comprehensive and systematic country-level daily stringency index, constructed based
on common policy responses implemented by governments to combat COVID-19 [23]. Strin-
gency is measured as a composite score, equally weighted and normalized between 0 and 100
for each country (with 100 being the strictest response), using eight ordinal indicators of con-
tainment, movement restriction, and closure policies, and a ninth indicator measuring the
coordinated presence of public awareness campaigns on the pandemic. The containment indi-
cators include school closures, workplace closure, cancellation of public events, restrictions on
gatherings, public transport closure, stay-at-home requirements, internal movement restric-
tions, and international travel controls.
Since the stringency index further tracks how quickly governments implemented or rolled
out their policy measures, we use the index as our primary independent variable of interest. As
contemporary stringency measures would affect mobility but its effect on the growth of the
pandemic would be observable only days after, we also use lagged values of the index in our
analyses. While the index provides a numerical score to the strictness of the policies enacted, it
does not reflect the compliance or effectiveness of the stringency put in place. The case for
compliance is more relevant when exploring the legally binding nature of the policies. For
example, Katafuchi et al. (2020) [24] shows that even without the declaration of a state of emer-
gency in Japan people partially suppressed their mobility. Although, expectedly, mobility was
suppressed more with the state of emergency in place. This paper aims to provide a more com-
prehensive overview of mobility changes, and their subsequent role in containing the conta-
gion, with or without legally binding policies. Hence, while a higher score in the index reflects
a willingness for greater stringency, it does not necessarily translate to a country’s response
being better than countries with a lower score.
It is also important to note while some countries enacted rigid mobility and activity restric-
tions, other countries adopted more flexible measures. Further, these levels of flexibility/rigid-
ity have changed within a country over time. OxCGRT integrates these fluctuations into their
stringency index by categorizing each of the nine indicators into ordinal levels by the rigidity
of the restriction. For example, school closures are categorized into “0—no measures; 1—rec-
ommend closing or all schools open with alterations resulting in significant differences com-
pared to non-Covid-19 operations; 2—require closing (only some levels or categories, for eg.
just high school, or just public schools); 3—require closing all levels” [25]. The final stringency
index is then a composite weighted index where higher values reflect the levels of rigidity of
the restrictions. Please refer to [25] for details on the index’s construction. S1–S9 Figs in S1
Appendix provide event graphs of the stringency index by country over time for all 127 coun-
tries in our sample. Values above 50 can be interpreted as the country undertaking relatively
stricter measures.
2.1.3 COVID-19 outbreak data. We source COVID-19 country-specific daily data on
confirmed cases per million and deaths attributed to COVID-19 per million from the Johns
Hopkins Center for Systems Science and Engineering (CSSE) COVID-19 data repository [26].
We combine this with tests per million population data collated by Our World In Data
(OWID). Since it takes some time for delayed reporting to be reflected in the dataset, we use
7-day moving averages of the outbreak variables and restrict our focus to events between Feb-
ruary 15, 2020, to July 30, 2020. It is perhaps worth mentioning that even if we do not use
moving averages, our conclusions remain the same. Results are available upon request. We
construct daily growth rates of 7-day moving averages for the outbreak variables—tests, cases,
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cases to tests ratio, deaths, and deaths to tests ratio—and use them as our second set of out-
comes. We explain the rationale behind using ratios in Section 2.2. OWID collects testing data
from country-specific official government reports and is available only from 85 countries. We
limit our analysis to the 127 countries (80 for tests) that have mobility, stringency, cases, and
deaths data available. The countries are listed in S1 Table in S1 Appendix.
Several studies and media outlets have reported that due to country-specific differences in
testing rates, data aggregation, and reporting quality, the number of cases and deaths are
under-reported [27–29]. Testing data, when available, has a strong selection bias with many
countries screening and testing only those people who presented symptoms. The extent of this
selection bias might be systematically related to country-specific characteristics. While we con-
trol for country and time fixed effects in our empirical specifications, it will not account for
systematic changes in selection bias over time across countries. Therefore, this study, like all
studies utilizing the CSSE and the OWID data, should be interpreted with a healthy dose of
skepticism. We further elaborate on such data limitations in Section 2.2 and what we do to
best circumvent the constraints.
2.1.4 Heterogeneity variables. To investigate the role of institutional heterogeneity in the
impact of the restrictions across developing and developed countries, we link our data with
various pre-COVID-19 country-specific demographic, health, and governance factors, that
may aid or hinder the stringency effect on people’s mobility and the spread of the disease.
Along the demography dimension, we examine heterogeneity by population density, educa-
tion, poverty headcount, economic inequality (Gini index), the share of the population aged 65
years or above, and air pollution per capita (measured by the concentration of suspended par-
ticulate matter in the air with a diameter of 2.5 micrometers or less—PM2.5). We also examine
heterogeneity by available hospital beds per 100 thousand population (a proxy of available
healthcare infrastructure), the share of the population with hand-washing facilities on-prem-
ises (a proxy for the availability of tools to combating the growth in transmissions), and the
death rate from cardiovascular diseases (CVD) (a proxy for share of the immune-compro-
mised population who face higher risks from COVID-19).
Finally, we examine heterogeneity along country’s governance indicators using the Econo-
mist Intelligence Unit (EIU) democracy index, government effectiveness from the Worldwide
Governance Indicators (WGI) [30], and the corruption perception index (CPI) developed by
Transparency International (TI), where larger values represent cleaner countries. The vast
majority of data from the demography and health dimensions are sourced from the World
Development Indicators (WDI), United Nations Population Division, or the Global Burden of
Disease Collaboration Network. S2 Table in S1 Appendix provides details of the sources for
each of the variables used, and Table 1 below presents the summary statistics.
The stringency index appears to be skewed to the left with a mean value of 64 below the
median of 71, meaning there is a relatively long tail of days with lower stringency scores. All
mobility measures, excluding residential mobility, show a percentage decrease in the visits
with the decrease being greatest at about 38 percent at transit stations, followed closely by
mobility around retail and recreation sites. On the other hand, the percentage change in time
spent at home increases by about 13 percent. Segregating the measures by developing vis-à-vis
developed countries, reported in S3 Table in S1 Appendix, shows that even though mean strin-
gency is relatively similar in both cohorts, mobility changes were mostly greater in developed
vis-à-vis developing countries (except in mobility around parks, and slightly for grocery and
pharmacy). This could be an initial indication of either overall lower compliance to mobility
restrictions in developing countries, or greater self-regulation in developed countries (for
example, while transit stations see a decrease of 34 percent in developing countries, developed
countries see a 40 percent decrease).
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Mean cumulative 7-day moving average daily growth rates of tests, cases, and deaths are
5, 7, and 7 percent, respectively, while that of the ratios are smaller, with cases to tests ratio
at 1 percent and deaths to tests ratio at 2 percent. Finally, while the mean statistic of the vari-
ables provides a snapshot of the overall sample, developing countries are, on average, signif-
icantly less educated, poorer, younger, more polluted, lack adequate health infrastructure,
face greater corruption, and have poorer levels of democracy and government effectiveness
(see S3 Table in S1 Appendix).
2.2 Data limitations
In the absence of a unified framework for testing and reporting for COVID-19 infections, the
available data suffers from a multitude of problems. These range from no count of COVID-
positive people who are not diagnosed including those asymptomatic, varying assay specificity
and sensitivity leading to false-negatives or false-positives, differences in testing, comorbidities,
Table 1. Summary statistics.
N Mean SD Median Min Max
Oxford Government Response Tracker
Stringency Index 18322 64.70 24.24 71.30 0.00 100.00
Google Mobility Measures
Retail and Recreation (% change) 18322 -33.34 26.54 -30.00 -97.00 42.00
Grocery and Pharmacy (% change) 18317 -15.07 22.39 -11.00 -97.00 94.00
Parks (% change) 18321 -7.38 53.33 -16.00 -95.00 517.00
Transit Stations (% change) 18322 -38.39 24.53 -39.00 -95.00 39.00
Workplaces (% change) 18322 -27.22 22.80 -26.00 -92.00 80.00
Residential (% change) 18246 13.14 10.16 12.00 -16.00 55.00
Outbreak Variables (Growth Rates of 7-Day Moving Average per million population)
Tests 10660 0.05 0.06 0.03 -0.01 0.97
Cases 18322 0.07 0.13 0.03 -0.13 2.65
Cases to Tests 10660 0.01 0.06 -0.00 -0.49 1.53
Deaths 15269 0.07 0.17 0.02 -0.01 4.01
Deaths to Tests 9676 0.02 0.10 -0.00 -0.44 3.24
Days since first case (by Country) 18322 76.99 44.80 76.00 -76.00 194.00
Heterogeneity Variables
Population Density 18158 232.08 772.33 87.32 1.98 7915.73
Primary Education 11557 78.79 23.23 87.54 13.87 100.00
Poverty Headcount (2011 PPP) 16294 9.43 16.02 1.40 0.00 62.90
Gini Index 16152 37.87 7.93 36.40 24.20 63.00
Population Aged 65 or older 18158 10.01 6.65 7.65 1.14 27.05
PM2.5 (2010–2017 Average) 17219 28.25 19.93 22.64 6.46 98.25
Corruption Perception Index 17373 47.10 19.70 41.00 14.00 88.00
Democracy Score 17412 6.01 2.09 6.33 1.93 9.87
Governance Effectiveness 18196 0.21 0.96 0.11 -2.24 2.23
Hospital Beds per 100k Population 16936 3.17 2.60 2.40 0.10 13.05
Handwashing Facilities 8032 57.15 29.72 59.61 2.73 99.00
CVD Death Rate 18185 236.83 117.38 218.61 79.37 597.03
Using available data from 15 Feb to 30 July, 2020.
Summary statistics by level of country development are available in S3 Table in S1 Appendix
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0253348.t001
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imperfect reporting, the release of incorrect data, and delays in reporting, to name a few. Ange-
lopoulos et al. (2020) [31] discusses how the problems could bias estimation in either direction
depending on their relative magnitude, and Millimet and Parmeter (2019) [32] provides a dis-
cussion of cases when data is skewed in one direction due to one-sided measurement errors.
While many of these data issues cannot be resolved, we interpret our estimates with caution
and perform various robustness checks to minimize the bias in the comparisons we make.
One glaring problem is the misreporting of the number of (per capita) confirmed cases. To
account for delays in reporting, we use 7-day moving averages of COVID-related measures.
However, the number of confirmed cases depends on the number of tests conducted, which
itself varies across time within each country. This variation across time within each country
will not be absorbed by the country or time fixed effects that we include in our specifications.
In general, however, countries have increased testing over time (which could be with country
income level or other country characteristics), albeit at differential rates. Using the growth rate
of cases would, therefore, bias our results. Instead, we use the ratio of cases to tests. If the rates
of infection in the untested population are similar to the rates of infection in the tested popula-
tion, the ratio of cases to tests is a better reflection of the prevailing disease situation.
Similar measurement errors plague the information about deaths due to COVID-19. For
surveillance purposes, WHO [33] defines a COVID-19 death “as a death resulting from a clini-
cally compatible illness in a probable or confirmed COVID-19 case, unless there is a clear
alternative cause of death that cannot be related to COVID-19 disease.” Since, COVID deaths
are ascertained in relation to probable or confirmed COVID-19 cases, where the latter depends
on the number of tests within a country, data about deaths due to COVID from different coun-
tries suffer from different levels of measurement errors. For example, even within Europe,
countries like Belgium have a more comprehensive approach to reporting deaths due to
COVID than the United Kingdom that does not count non-hospital fatalities [34]. But if the
rates of recovery from infections are similar in the tested and the untested population, the
infection fatality ratio (IFR ¼ deathsinfected) and the case fatality ratio (CFR ¼
deaths
cases ), reported by many
countries, can be relatively good measures of COVID-related mortality in the population.
However, as WHO [35] points out, the accuracy of these measures relies on two assumptions.
First, that the likelihood of detection of confirmed cases and deaths due to COVID is consis-
tent over time; and second, all detected cases are resolved (either recovered or died). Given
testing and reporting limitations, often both these assumptions might be violated.
Other studies have explored statistical methods to correct for the bias, each with their
own caveats (see for example, [36–39]). However, there is no agreement on whether these
statistical measures yield better estimates and whether one measure is superior to the others.
Instead, we construct a deaths to tests ratio as a measure of the disease situation. We prefer
using deaths to test ratio to deaths to infected and deaths to cases ratio because the latter
measures have time-varying measurement error in both the numerator and the denomina-
tor. Without any information on the relative degree of measurement error in the numerator
and the denominator, it would be difficult for us to sign the bias. While the information on
tests conducted is not free of measurement error, unless deliberately misreported by the
reporting country, the error should be relatively small. So, while the deaths to tests ratios are
not free of error, it is, arguably, the most comparable measure across countries. The esti-
mated effects, albeit differing in magnitude, remain qualitatively similar when we use other
measures: death per 100,000, infection fatality ratio, or case fatality ratio. In addition, since
countries varied in their approaches to track the spread of the disease, this measure allows us
to check the robustness of our results by limiting our sample to countries with relatively
more reliable infection rate data.
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There are three possible ways to limit the sample to countries that provide reliable test data.
First, in the absence of testing a randomly selected sample from the population that most
countries lack the resources to implement, Angelopoulos et al. (2020) [31] expands on how
contact tracing can be a powerful tool that allows otherwise intractable biases to be controlled.
Contact tracing expands to include a much larger section of the target population, specifically
a larger portion of mild and asymptomatic cases, that are otherwise left out from the testing
pool. The authors show that by assuming non-response rates to contact tracing as identical for
asymptomatic and symptomatic cases, asymptotically unbiased estimations can be obtained.
Therefore, we could limit our sample to the 59 countries that conducted comprehensive con-
tact tracing and tests (which also has a good split of developed and developing countries, as
indicated in S1 Table in S1 Appendix). S4 Table in S1 Appendix reports the mean of the 7-day
moving average growth rates by no, limited, and full contact tracing. As expected, the growth
rate means fall with increasing contact tracing. But the means fall only slightly when compared
to the full sample, except for the cases to tests ratio.
A second approach could be to limit the sample by the country testing policy. Data from
countries with an open public testing policy might be better representative than from countries
with only limited testing. But it would still suffer from selection bias as people might self-select
into testing. OxCGRT categorizes testing policy into four groups: (1) no testing policy, (2) lim-
ited testing of those who both have symptoms and meet specific criteria (eg. key workers,
admitted to hospital, came into contact with a known case, returned from overseas), (3) symp-
tom-based testing, and (4) open public testing. S4 Table in S1 Appendix once again shows the
falling growth rate means with better testing policy. However, only 34 countries conducted
open public testing within the timeframe of our study, resulting in a much smaller sample of
2,866 (compared to 10,539 for the full sample). Further, since only developed countries with
adequate resources were able to adopt this testing approach, restricting the sample by the
country’s testing policy will be against the purpose of this study.
A third approach could be restricting the sample according to the type of testing data
reported. A vast majority of countries report only the total number of tests conducted, double-
counting follow-up or repeat tests for the same person [40]. This double-counting would, in
most cases, exert an upward bias on the estimated effects. Thus, limiting the sample to only the
countries that report the number of people tested may be a viable approach. Austin and Kacha-
lia [2020] [40] posits that these countries may also be reporting quality data relative to others.
However, only 21 countries reported the number of people tested, and when compared, S4
Table in S1 Appendix shows that the growth rate means are fairly similar between the two
groups that reported the number of people tested and that reported the total number of tests.
Among the three approaches, we believe restricting the sample by comprehensive contact
tracing would work best in minimizing measurement error in testing. Further, since testing
strategies have changed over time for some countries, limiting the sample to days when contact
tracing was done as a consistent testing strategy, will also be a good robustness check for our
results. First, we conduct our analysis using the full sample. Then, we check the robustness of
the findings using the restricted sample of countries (and days) that conducted comprehensive
contact tracing as a consistent testing strategy.
One other data concern is that policy stringency measures from OxCGRT capture only the
restrictions imposed, and not how they are enforced or the behavior of the citizens. Our esti-
mates, therefore, are net of enforcement, compliance, and mitigating self-disciplining behavior
of the citizens. One of the nine indicators used to construct the stringency index is a measure
of the coordinated presence of public awareness campaigns about the virus. Any change in the
citizens’ self-disciplining due to public awareness campaigns should be captured by this com-
ponent of the stringency measure. Therefore, the stringency effect not only reflects citizens’
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response to policy measures put in place but also any self-disciplining effect. The available data
do not permit us to disentangle the two.
2.3 Empirical strategy
Investigating the causal impact of the level of stringency on the mobility indicators and
COVID-19 outbreak growth rate variables present a few empirical challenges. While we do not
provide a theoretical model to mathematically breakdown the causal mechanism, Keppo et al.
(2020) [41] extend the epidemiological SIR model to a “behavioral SIR model” and is a good
resource for anyone looking for a theoretical construct. First, governments around the world
enacted these measures in response to the disease situation in their countries. Therefore, ordi-
nary least squares estimation (OLS) of the associations between the stringency of the policy
measures and the outbreak growth rates could be driven by reverse causality—countries with
worse disease situations had to enact more stringent measures to control the contagion. Simi-
larly, even without the announced restrictions, countries with a higher proportion of circum-
spect population might see a decrease in both mobility and disease spread. The governments
in these countries might have responded to the expectation this could have placed on the gov-
ernment to support their citizens. Country or time fixed effects will not be able to account for
the changes in expectations people have from their government or actions of the government
in response to these expectations across time. There is also considerable variation in how well
and how soon governments might have reacted to the disease environment in the country.
That is, the extent to reverse causality also varies by country. Further, as discussed in section
2.2, the outcome measures likely suffer from non-classical measurement errors. For example,
less educated countries might be less stringent and might also have larger measurement errors
in recording cases and deaths. All these factors will bias the OLS estimates.
To address these concerns, we opt for an instrumental variable (IV) approach. We use the
level of stringency in countries other than country c on date t, to predict the level of stringency
of the restrictions in the country c on date t. The rationale is that governments, in deciding the
level of stringency of the restriction, looked not only at the disease condition in their own
country but also what they expected would happen if they did not impose stricter measures.
Since there was no way for them to predict the counterfactual scenario, they looked at the situ-
ation of other countries. In particular, they observed the actions other countries in the world
were taking. If a country observed that other countries around the world were imposing strict
restrictions, it could have been also inclined to enact stricter restrictions regardless of the dis-
ease situation at home. Since a country did not observe the private signal of other countries
about how bad they expected the situation to become, the country used the observable decision
of other countries to inform its own decision. This is at least likely to be true in the initial stages
of the COVID-19 pandemic (see [19]), the timeframe in concern for this study. However, lock-
downs and other such extreme restrictions are not sustainable for long, especially in develop-
ing countries, with countries soon facing pressure to gradually open up while balancing
various health and socio-economic concerns [42]. So, the level of stringency of the policy mea-
sures in a country c at time t must be correlated with the stringency of the policy measures in
the rest of the world, satisfying the relevance requirement for the IV.
While the day-to-day variations in the extent of governments-imposed restrictions in the
rest of the world might influence a country’s propensity to impose mobility and activity restric-
tions, it should not, at least in the short-run, significantly affect the level of activity and the
growth rate of confirmed cases or deaths in the country. However, one possibility is if in the
presence of a lead time prior to implementing travel bans, asymptomatic individuals traveled
to avoid anticipated restrictions in the home country, and thereby seeded an outbreak in
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another country, thus directly driving cases/deaths. While this possibility is indeed difficult to
negate using available data, we try to minimize this possibility by comparing several different
geographical definitions of our instrument. We use the World Bank’s classification of world
regions and sub-regions for this exercise. In the preferred specification, we construct the
instrument measuring the average level of stringency at time t in countries in our sample
excluding all countries in the same sub-region s as country c to minimize the effects of spill-
overs of infections across borders. Other definitions we explore are (1) World stringency
minus country stringency, (2) Region stringency minus country stringency, (3) Sub-region
stringency minus country stringency, and (4) World stringency minus region stringency. The
results using these alternative instruments are reported in the S1 Appendix.
Another scenario where the instrument will not be valid is if individual behavior is domi-
nantly affected not only by the news she receives in her home country but also by the news she
receives from around the world. That is if her behavior is affected directly by stringency poli-
cies in other countries. However, as the event study presented in Fig 1 below shows, this has
not been the case.
In Fig 1, Day = 0 represents the day of national lockdown while the red line to the left of
Day = 0 represents the average number of days prior when the date of national lockdown was
announced/recommended. As can be seen, changes in mobility are in a sharp response to
changing stringency in the home country. The change in mobility is most stark after the date
of national lockdown was announced/recommended, remaining fairly constant prior to that,
and reaching its peak almost concurrently with the day of national lockdown. However, note
that given the differential timing of when countries implemented actions to restrict activity,
Day = 0 varies across countries given there was not a singular date when countries imple-
mented these measures. So one can argue for the case that the change in mobility is picking up
both the response to the home country’s action as well as other countries’ activity restricting
policies prior to the home country’s implementation. In order to check for this possibility, we
plot separate event study graphs for each country and see that the change in mobility is most
stark after the date of lockdown was announced/recommended at home country, and is not
driven by lockdowns of other countries. This suggests that individual behavior was dominantly
affected by the news she receives in her home country. Therefore, the exclusion restriction is
likely to hold.
The first stage of our preferred 2SLS specification is as follows:
First Stage : Stringencyc;t ¼ a1þ b1� Stringencyw  s;t þ y1c þ d1t  i þ ε1c;t ð1Þ
where, Stringencyc,t is the level of stringency of the measures at time t in country c. Stringencyw−s,t
measures the average level of stringency at time t in countries in our sample excluding all coun-
tries in the sub-region s of country c. We also tried instruments by ranking each country’s
GDP/capita and categorizing them into 10 quantile groups. Then two instruments were con-
structed as follows: (i) Quantile group minus country average, and (ii) Other quantile groups
minus country quantile group average. We get similar results using these instruments as our
preferred specification and are available upon request. Excluding the sub-region also provides
more overall variation to the instrument, even though under this specification it does not vary
within a sub-region (at time t). Note that even with the other definitions of the instrument,
where it varies within sub-regions, our results remain consistent in significance and direction,
as can be seen in the S1 Appendix. θ1c controls for time-invariant unobservables and differ-
ences across countries that capture factors like differential measurement errors in outcomes
variables, levels of health and health infrastructure, times at which the first case was detected in
different countries, and so on. δ1t−i controls for effects that are associated with days since the
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first confirmed case in the country, where i is the day of the first confirmed case. We believe
δ1t−i does a better job at capturing the time-varying unobservable factors that might affect
stringency across countries. This is because how the disease spreads within a country depends
on when the first confirmed case was detected. For example, since the first confirmed case in
China was much earlier than in the United States of America, there is no reason why both
countries will have a similar level of unobservable factors affecting Stringencyc,t on February
15, 2020. Both the fixed effects, θ1c and δ1t−i, thus attempts to control for any correlation of
unobservables with other countries’ stringency, and own country cases/deaths/mobility.
We then use the predicted values of Stringencyc,t in:
Second Stage : Yc;t ¼ a2þ b2� dStringencyc;t þ y2c þ d2t  i þ ε2c;t ð2Þ
where Yc,t is any of the mobility or outbreak growth rate outcomes for country c at time t. In
Fig 1. Event study of days since country lockdown(= 0) and mobility measures. Event study of 107 countries with
national lockdown. Percentage change in mobility is in reference to the median value of mobility for the
corresponding day of the week during the 5 weeks of January 3, 2020, to February 6, 2020. Day = 0 represents the day
of national lockdown in the home country. The red line to the left of Day = 0 represents the average number of days
prior to lockdown when the date of national lockdown was announced/recommended.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0253348.g001
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some of our second stage specifications, we replace dStringencyc;t with dStringencyc;t  7 ,
dStringencyc;t  14 , dStringencyc;t  21 , or dStringencyc;t  28 to account for the possibility that the impact
of a change in stringency on the number of confirmed cases and deaths might show up after a
lag. We cluster the standards errors at the level of the country. Note that our instrument does
not correct for non-classical measurement errors. However, in the preferred specification,
excluding all other countries in the sub-region can minimize the chances of the measurement
error in the instrument being correlated with measurement error in the endogenous variable.
In the case of skewed or one-sided measurement error in the dependent variable, as is likely
our case with the under-reporting of cases and deaths, Millimet and Parmeter (2019) [32] pro-
poses using stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) or nonlinear least squares (NLLS) estimation to
correct for such bias. Similar approaches has been used by Hofler and List (2004) [43] and
Kumbhakar et al. (2012) [44] to correct for systematic over- or under-bidding in auctions, and
by Anthopolos and Becker (2010) [45] to correct for undercounting in infant mortality data.
As a robustness check, we repeat our analyses using SFA and NLLS estimators and find our
results to be qualitatively similar to the ones reported using 2SLS. SFA and NLLS results are
available upon request.
A decrease in mobility and activity, due to the stricter restrictions, may not necessarily
decrease the growth of deaths due to the virus. For example, if those infected transfer it to oth-
ers in and around their living quarters, infections and deaths may not decrease even if mobility
does. To understand better the effectiveness of decreasing mobility and activity on the conta-
gion, we estimate a three-stage recursive conditional mixed-process (CMP) model from Rood-
man (2011) [46]. The process is akin to a 3-Stages Least Square methodology, and similar to
the 2SLS estimator assumes Stringencyw−s,t to be exogenous. To understand the intuition









That is, the ratio of the causal IV estimate of the impact of the stringency index on the growth
rates to the impact of the stringency index on mobility is an estimate of how mobility affected
the growth rates of cases or deaths in different countries. The system of equations is as follows:
Stringencyc;t ¼ a1þ b1� Stringencyw  s;t þ g1c þ t1t  i þ �1c;t ð3Þ
Mobilityc;t ¼ a2þ b2� dStringencyc;t þ g2c þ t2t  i þ �2c;t ð4Þ
Growth Ratec;t ¼ a3þ b3� dMobilityc;t þ g3c þ t3t  i þ �3c;t ð5Þ
This allows us to compare how changes in mobility, due to stringent policy measures,
affected the growth rates of cases to tests or deaths to tests ratios in different countries. We use
mobility at public transport transit stations for this analysis.
3 Results
The mobility and activity restrictions enacted by countries around the world aimed at contain-
ing the contagion by limiting human-to-human contact. However, it is not obvious whether
these restrictions actually limited mobility and activity; it depended on people’s will and ability
to observe these restrictions and their government’s ability to enforce them. For example, mul-
tiple factors including, but not limited to, the level of education, trust in the government, and
ability to maintain basic consumption expenditure without working, affect the extent to which
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citizens of a country might observe the restrictions. In Table 2, we begin by examining the
impact of these restrictions on mobility. The dependent variables in columns (1) to (6) are the
percentage changes in mobility in areas of the country as compared to the median value for
the corresponding day of the week, during the 5 weeks of January 3, 2020, to February 6, 2020.
The first five panels of the table present the association between these dependent variables and
the stringency of the restrictions in the country at distinct points in time.
The estimated coefficient for Stringency Index (Lag 0) reports the association between
mobility and contemporaneous restrictions. Similarly, coefficients for Stringency Index (Lag
7), Stringency Index (Lag 14), Stringency Index (Lag 21), and Stringency Index (Lag 28) report
the association of the mobility measures with the stringency of the restrictions seven, fourteen,
twenty-one, and twenty-eight days ago, respectively. All specifications include country fixed-
effects and the number of days since the first case fixed effect, and we cluster the standard
errors at the country level.
Two observations stand out. First, the restrictions had the intended impact—countries with
stricter restrictions observed a higher reduction in mobility in public areas and an increase in
time spent in residential areas. This is consistent with the associations between restrictions and
mobility that [12, 14, 16, 17] report. Second, as expected, contemporaneous restrictions matter
more than past restrictions. The magnitude of the association of mobility measures falls with
increasing lagged days of stringency of the restrictions.
The next five panels of the table present the results from the instrumental variable (IV)
approach. As we discuss in Section 2, we use the level of stringency of the restrictions in coun-
tries in the rest of the world to predict the level of stringency in a country. The rationale, once
again, is that countries, while deciding on the level of stringency responded not only to the dis-
ease situation at the home country but also to how it was expected to evolve. To predict how
the situation would have evolved and what the optimal level of stringency might have been,
every country looked at the rest of the countries in the world. Therefore, while the level of
stringency in the rest of the world affected the stringency of the restrictions in a country, it did
not affect the mobility and the disease situation in the country directly. That is, the exclusion
restriction is likely to be satisfied. We use several definitions of the instrumental variable, all of
which yield similar results. We present the results from using alternative instruments in S5
and S6 Tables in S1 Appendix. In what follows, we present results from our preferred IV speci-
fication where we use the stringency in the countries outside the sub-region to which the coun-
try belongs. Excluding countries from the sub-regions minimize the chances of the stringency
in other countries affecting the mobility or spread of the disease in the country through path-
ways other than affecting the country’s restriction stringency. The first stage F-stats are pro-
vided under each estimation and are well above the conventionally accepted threshold of 10
(for the case of a single endogenous regressor; see, [47]), indicating that the instrument is rele-
vant and not weak. Compared to the association results in the first five panels, the IV causal
estimates are slightly larger in magnitude. But the two broad observations remain unchanged
—countries with stricter restrictions observed higher reduction in mobility, and contempora-
neous restrictions matter more than past restrictions.
Next, in Table 3, we examine the impact of the level of stringency of the restrictions on the
7-day moving average growth rates of the numbers of tests conducted, confirmed cases, cases
to tests ratio, deaths attributed to COVID-19, and deaths to tests ratio across time in different
countries. The first five panels present the associations for comparison, but the discussion
hereon will focus on the IV results. Compared to Table 2 where the contemporaneous restric-
tions had the largest impact on mobility, the stringency of the measures seven days and four-
teen days ago have a larger impact on the growth rate of confirmed cases and deaths attributed
to COVID-19. Given the current scientific understanding that the virus has an incubation and
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Table 2. Impact of stricter restrictions on mobility.
VARIABLES (1) Retail Recreation (2) Grocery Pharmacy (3) Parks (4) Transit Stations (5) Workplaces (6) Residential
OLS
Stringency Index (Lag 0) -0.89��� -0.53��� -0.73��� -0.81��� -0.68��� 0.31���
(0.03) (0.03) (0.08) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01)
Mean of DV -33.35 -15.70 -7.38 -38.39 -27.22 13.14
Stringency Index (Lag 7) -0.75��� -0.48��� -0.64��� -0.68��� -0.56��� 0.26���
(0.03) (0.03) (0.08) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01)
Mean of DV -33.70 -15.25 -7.54 -38.79 -27.50 13.28
Stringency Index (Lag 14) -0.55��� -0.35��� -0.47��� -0.48��� -0.39��� 0.19���
(0.03) (0.02) (0.07) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01)
Mean of DV -34.18 -15.50 -7.73 -39.31 -27.88 13.45
Stringency Index (Lag 21) -0.35��� -0.21��� -0.31��� -0.29��� -0.22��� 0.11���
(0.03) (0.02) (0.07) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01)
Mean of DV -35.05 -16.00 -8.03 -40.28 -28.65 13.77
Stringency Index (Lag 28) -0.17��� -0.08��� -0.18��� -0.13��� -0.05�� 0.05���
(0.03) (0.02) (0.07) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Mean of DV -36.16 -16.77 -8.41 -41.52 -29.65 14.19
2SLS: Excluding Subregion IV
Stringency Index (Lag 0) -1.12��� -0.69��� -0.60��� -1.05��� -0.92��� 0.38���
(0.05) (0.04) (0.09) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02)
Mean of DV -33.34 -15.07 -7.38 -38.39 -27.22 13.14
F-Stat 268.00 267.95 268.00 268.00 268.00 267.67
Stringency Index (Lag 7) -0.93��� -0.63��� -0.47��� -0.88��� -0.79��� 0.33���
(0.04) (0.04) (0.09) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02)
Mean of DV -33.70 -15.24 -7.53 -38.78 -27.50 13.27
F-Stat 286.24 286.14 286.24 286.24 286.24 285.40
Stringency Index (Lag 14) -0.66��� -0.47��� -0.27��� -0.62��� -0.57��� 0.24���
(0.04) (0.03) (0.09) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02)
Mean of DV -34.17 -15.50 -7.73 -39.31 -27.88 13.45
F-Stat 294.44 294.30 294.45 294.44 294.44 293.05
Stringency Index (Lag 21) -0.39��� -0.28��� -0.09 -0.35��� -0.31��� 0.13���
(0.05) (0.03) (0.09) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02)
Mean of DV -35.05 -15.99 -8.03 -40.28 -28.65 13.77
F-Stat 303.31 303.16 303.31 303.31 303.31 300.92
Stringency Index (Lag 28) -0.14��� -0.10��� 0.05 -0.11��� -0.07� 0.04��
(0.05) (0.03) (0.08) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02)
Mean of DV -36.16 -16.76 -8.40 -41.52 -29.65 14.19
F-Stat 312.68 312.58 312.67 312.68 312.68 311.26
Observations (Lag 0) 18,322 18,317 18,321 18,322 18,322 18,246
Observations (Lag 7) 18,119 18,114 18,118 18,119 18,119 18,043
Observations (Lag 14) 17,850 17,845 17,849 17,850 17,850 17,774
Observations (Lag 21) 17,398 17,393 17,397 17,398 17,398 17,322
Observations (Lag 28) 16,792 16,787 16,791 16,792 16,792 16,716
Number of country 127 127 127 127 127 127
Fixed Effects Country; Days since first case
Robust standard errors clustered at the country level.
� p < 0.10;
�� p < 0.05;
��� p< 0.01.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0253348.t002
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Table 3. Impact of stricter restrictions on 7-day moving average growth rates.
VARIABLES (1) Tests (2) Cases (3) Cases:Tests (4) Deaths (5) Deaths:Tests
OLS
Stringency Index (Lag 0) -0.0000 -0.0006��� -0.0005� -0.0019��� -0.0007
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Mean of DV 0.047 0.071 0.006 0.070 0.018
Stringency Index (Lag 7) -0.0003� -0.0014��� -0.0006��� -0.0024��� -0.0011���
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Mean of DV 0.046 0.071 0.006 0.069 0.017
Stringency Index (Lag 14) -0.0004��� -0.0014��� -0.0006��� -0.0026��� -0.0013���
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Mean of DV 0.046 0.069 0.006 0.069 0.017
Stringency Index (Lag 21) -0.0004��� -0.0012��� -0.0005��� -0.0022��� -0.0012���
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0003)
Mean of DV 0.044 0.063 0.005 0.067 0.017
Stringency Index (Lag 28) -0.0004��� -0.0009��� -0.0004��� -0.0016��� -0.0009���
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Mean of DV 0.041 0.055 0.002 0.063 0.016
2SLS: Excluding Subregion IV
Stringency Index (Lag 0) -0.0007�� -0.0015��� -0.0011�� -0.0060��� -0.0050���
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0013) (0.0019)
Mean of DV 0.047 0.071 0.006 0.070 0.018
F-Stat 41.899 267.999 41.899 65.795 31.513
Stringency Index (Lag 7) -0.0009��� -0.0033��� -0.0019��� -0.0053��� -0.0039���
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0010)
Mean of DV 0.046 0.071 0.006 0.069 0.017
F-Stat 58.113 286.243 58.113 123.500 37.763
Stringency Index (Lag 14) -0.0009��� -0.0033��� -0.0018��� -0.0046��� -0.0032���
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0006)
Mean of DV 0.046 0.069 0.006 0.069 0.017
F-Stat 78.483 294.437 78.483 187.783 55.454
Stringency Index (Lag 21) -0.0007��� -0.0018��� -0.0009��� -0.0037��� -0.0024���
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0004)
Mean of DV 0.044 0.063 0.005 0.067 0.017
F-Stat 96.858 303.310 96.858 234.248 73.762
Stringency Index (Lag 28) -0.0006��� -0.0013��� -0.0006��� -0.0026��� -0.0018���
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Mean of DV 0.041 0.055 0.002 0.063 0.016
F-Stat 116.105 312.677 116.105 261.507 94.749
Observations (Lag 0) 10,660 18,322 10,660 15,268 9,675
Observations (Lag 7) 10,607 18,119 10,607 15,215 9,651
Observations (Lag 14) 10,537 17,850 10,537 15,149 9,622
Observations (Lag 21) 10,400 17,398 10,400 15,050 9,584
Observations (Lag 28) 10,133 16,792 10,133 14,860 9,499
Number of country 80 127 80 121 78
Fixed Effects Country; Days since first case
Robust standard errors clustered at the country level.
� p < 0.10;
�� p < 0.05;
��� p< 0.01.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0253348.t003
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infection period of up to fourteen days, this is expected. Second, even if we focus only on the
effect of stringency seven or fourteen days prior, there appears to be a much smaller effect on
the number of tests. There is no reason why the number of tests conducted, given the testing
infrastructure of a country is controlled for by the country fixed effects, would have been
largely affected by a decrease in mobility. It is possible that with reduced mobility, events like
accidents that require medical attention decreases reducing the pressure on the health infra-
structure that could then be devoted to COVID-19 testing. However, that would have lead to
an increase in testing, which is not what we observe.
However, the more stringent the measures, the lower the growth in the number of con-
firmed cases and deaths attributed to COVID-19. The impact on cases and deaths suggests
that stricter restrictions achieved their goal of containing the contagion. The impacts on the
growth rate of the two ratio variables are, as expected, smaller in magnitude but follow the
same trends. Since we believe them to be better indicators, we report results with the growth
rates of cases to tests and deaths to tests, hereon. As discussed in Section 2.2, in S7 Table in S1
Appendix we show that the results are robust to using restricted samples by testing approaches
followed by different countries. The coefficients, when the sample is limited to countries and
dates with full contact tracing as a consistent testing strategy, are similar to that of the full sam-
ple and follow the same trend.
But were restrictions equally effective across developing and developed countries, and ade-
quate to contain the contagion? Countries with differing institutional capacities are likely to
respond differently in not only adopting stringency measures [48] but also in their subsequent
role in curbing mobility and in containing the contagion. Heterogeneity analysis by demogra-
phy, the status of the health infrastructure, and governance indicators will help us understand
the mechanisms and the role of other institutional and cultural factors. To find out, we split
the sample of countries at the median for a range of characteristics and repeat the analysis.
Another approach would be to include all these different dimensions of heterogeneity in one
regression. However, setting aside the multicollinearity concerns that would arise from such
an approach, we are not interested in individual heterogeneity coefficients along these dimen-
sions but rather what they suggest collectively.
We present the heterogeneity in the impact of stringency on mobility in Tables 4 and 5,
along with its coefficients plot in Fig 2 presented below. The first and last three columns in
each panel of the tables report the impact of imposing stricter restrictions on mobility in coun-
tries below and above the median along the different dimensions. Comparing column (1) with
column (4), column (2) with column (5), and column (3) with column (6), stricter restrictions
had a larger marginal effect in limiting mobility in densely populated, less educated, poorer,
more unequal, more polluted countries with younger but unhealthier populations and worse
health infrastructure. From their description, and affirmed by the segregated summary statis-
tics presented in S3 Table in S1 Appendix, these characteristics describe the relatively less-
developed countries in the sample. The restrictions also worked better in more democratic
countries, with better government effectiveness and lower perceived levels of corruption.
Finally, it should be noted from Fig 2 that not all two-point estimates are statistically signifi-
cantly different from each other; but rather the purpose of the exercise is to point towards gen-
eral trends of the coefficients over the different mobility measures.
However, this stronger effect of stringency on mobility does not imply that the relatively
less-developed countries contained the contagion better. First, it is important to note that
upon announcement of the lock-downs, many less-developed countries witnessed large migra-
tion of urban migrant workers back to their homes in rural areas before the lockdown came
into effect, relevant for the timeframe explored in this study (see, for example [49], for the case
in India). With limited mobility (or mobility not captured in the Google data) in their rural
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Table 4. Heterogenous impact of stricter restrictions on mobility 1.
VARIABLES (1) Transit Stations (2) Workplaces (3) Residential (4) Transit Stations (5) Workplaces (6) Residential
< Median > Median
Population Density
Stringency Index (Lag 14) -0.42��� -0.57��� 0.21��� -0.63��� -0.59��� 0.26���
(0.06) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05) (0.05) (0.02)
Observations 8,590 8,590 8,564 9,262 9,262 9,212
Number of country 63 63 63 64 64 64
Mean of DV -37.12 -26.09 12.76 -41.35 -29.55 14.09
F-Stat 231.90 231.90 231.61 138.16 138.16 137.49
Primary Education
Stringency Index (Lag 14) -0.48��� -0.50��� 0.25��� -0.64��� -0.56��� 0.23���
(0.05) (0.04) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.02)
Observations 5,504 5,504 5,479 12,348 12,348 12,297
Number of country 39 39 39 88 88 88
Mean of DV -46.99 -30.94 17.13 -35.89 -26.52 11.81
F-Stat 282.80 282.80 284.34 200.16 200.16 198.94
Poverty Head Count
Stringency Index (Lag 14) -0.55��� -0.49��� 0.21��� -0.68��� -0.62��� 0.29���
(0.05) (0.04) (0.02) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03)
Observations 8,209 8,209 8,207 9,643 9,643 9,569
Number of country 56 56 56 71 71 71
Mean of DV -36.85 -29.54 11.21 -41.41 -26.47 15.37
F-Stat 157.08 157.08 157.08 124.40 124.40 123.23
Gini Index
Stringency Index (Lag 14) -0.53��� -0.51��� 0.22��� -0.66��� -0.61��� 0.27���
(0.06) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03)
Observations 7,851 7,851 7,849 10,001 10,001 9,927
Number of country 55 55 55 72 72 72
Mean of DV -34.65 -26.89 9.92 -42.97 -28.66 16.23
F-Stat 124.98 124.98 124.98 175.87 175.87 174.51
Age 65 & Older
Stringency Index (Lag 14) -0.67��� -0.56��� 0.26��� -0.53��� -0.50��� 0.24���
(0.05) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05) (0.05) (0.02)
Observations 8,623 8,623 8,572 9,229 9,229 9,204
Number of country 63 63 63 64 64 64
Mean of DV -39.75 -25.05 14.47 -38.91 -30.53 12.50
F-Stat 287.80 170.79 307.09 135.07 91.81 108.58
PM2.5
Stringency Index (Lag 14) -0.54��� -0.50��� 0.23��� -0.62��� -0.55��� 0.25���
(0.06) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.02)
Observations 8,572 8,572 8,551 9,280 9,280 9,225
Number of country 59 59 59 68 68 68
Mean of DV -39.14 -30.17 12.99 -39.48 -25.77 13.88
F-Stat 194.59 145.15 153.11 101.77 32.78 79.06
Fixed Effects Country; Days since first case
Robust standard errors clustered at the country level.
� p < 0.10;
�� p < 0.05;
��� p< 0.01.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0253348.t004
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Table 5. Heterogenous impact of stricter restrictions on mobility 2.
VARIABLES (1) Transit Stations (2) Workplaces (3) Residential (4) Transit Stations (5) Workplaces (6) Residential
< Median > Median
Corruption Perception Index
Stringency Index (Lag 14) -0.54��� -0.45��� 0.20��� -0.70��� -0.66��� 0.28���
(0.05) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05) (0.05) (0.02)
Observations 7,792 7,792 7,773 10,060 10,060 10,003
Number of country 57 57 57 70 70 70
Mean of DV -38.50 -25.89 14.14 -39.94 -29.43 12.91
F-Stat 210.24 210.24 209.84 160.18 160.18 159.78
Democracy Score
Stringency Index (Lag 14) -0.52��� -0.55��� 0.25��� -0.66��� -0.61��� 0.25���
(0.06) (0.06) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.02)
Observations 8,077 8,077 8,058 9,775 9,775 9,718
Number of country 59 59 59 68 68 68
Mean of DV -37.78 -24.46 13.29 -40.58 -30.71 13.58
F-Stat 186.80 186.80 186.41 147.05 147.05 146.10
Government Effectiveness
Stringency Index (Lag 14) -0.57��� -0.48��� 0.21��� -0.68��� -0.64��� 0.27���
(0.05) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05) (0.05) (0.02)
Observations 8,810 8,810 8,784 9,042 9,042 8,992
Number of country 64 64 64 63 63 63
Mean of DV -38.30 -26.18 13.94 -40.30 -29.54 12.97
F-Stat 185.93 185.93 185.54 150.79 150.79 150.31
Hospital Beds per 100k
Stringency Index (Lag 14) -0.61��� -0.53��� 0.23��� -0.66��� -0.62��� 0.26���
(0.05) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03)
Observations 8,048 8,048 8,016 9,804 9,804 9,760
Number of country 58 58 58 69 69 69
Mean of DV -42.92 -28.25 16.01 -36.35 -27.58 11.34
F-Stat 335.75 335.75 336.19 143.69 143.69 142.33
Handwashing Facilities
Stringency Index (Lag 14) -0.63��� -0.49��� 0.23��� -0.64��� -0.60��� 0.25���
(0.06) (0.07) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.02)
Observations 3,891 3,891 3,891 13,961 13,961 13,885
Number of country 29 29 29 98 98 98
Mean of DV -34.38 -20.86 13.65 -40.69 -29.84 13.39
F-Stat 202.92 202.92 202.92 222.25 222.25 220.55
Cardiovascular Diseases Death Rate
Stringency Index (Lag 14) -0.51��� -0.52��� 0.25��� -0.62��� -0.53��� 0.22���
(0.06) (0.06) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.02)
Observations 8,944 8,944 8,906 8,908 8,908 8,870
Number of country 62 62 62 65 65 65
Mean of DV -43.62 -32.11 15.46 -34.99 -23.63 11.43
F-Stat 124.63 124.63 123.19 201.92 201.92 200.94
Fixed Effects Country; Days since first case
Robust standard errors clustered at the country level.
� p < 0.10;
�� p < 0.05;
��� p< 0.01.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0253348.t005
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homes, this can contribute to the stronger stringency effect on mobility for less-developed
countries, while not translating to better contagion containment. Second, it may be that people
in more developed countries were already socially distancing even in the absence of these
restrictions [50]. From S3 Table in S1 Appendix we know that compliance to mobility
Fig 2. Coefficient plots of hetegeneous impact of stricter restriction on mobility. Coefficient plots are constructed using results from Tables 4 and 5 with
90% confidence intervals.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0253348.g002
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restrictions was potentially lower in less-developed countries. This is supported by several
other studies. For example, Ali et al. (2020) [51] report that compliance to lockdown measures
for most people in Bangladesh was conditional on proper relief distribution by the government
(the lack of which, due to weak institutional capacity, lead to the effective end of lockdown).
Choudhury et al. (2020) [52] also show that food security policies played a crucial role in
ensuring lockdown compliance in India. Thus, a lower self-disciplining behavior of the citizens
in less-developed countries may be leading to the larger marginal effects of stringency on
mobility in the countries. Think of this as being similar to an early point on a diminishing
marginal returns curve, resulting in a larger marginal effect, but not with an overall greater
reduction in mobility. Similarly, it is also possible that countries with a population in better
health and adequate health infrastructure, handled the infections better, even if the restrictions
were not stringent or if the populations were lax about observing them (examples include Swe-
den, Norway, and Germany).
We see this in Tables 6 and 7, and its coefficients plot in Fig 3 presented below. As opposed
to the results in Tables 4 and 5, stricter measures contained the contagion better in richer,
more educated, more equal, less-polluted countries with older but healthier populations and
better health infrastructure. From the description, the countries appear to be the more devel-
oped countries in the sample. These results are partly in contrast with association results from
[14] that finds the correlation between stricter pandemic policies and lower future mortality
growth was more pronounced in countries with a greater proportion of the elderly population,
higher density, greater proportion of employees in vulnerable occupations, greater democratic
freedom, more international travels, and further distance from the equator. The differences in
our findings highlight the need to distinguish causal effects of these restrictions from associa-
tions. Not surprisingly, the restrictions also worked better in more democratic countries, with
better government effectiveness and lower perceived levels of corruption. The results from
Tables 4–7 taken together suggest that even though stricter restrictions worked better at limit-
ing mobility in relatively less developed countries, it did not translate into better control of the
contagion. Once again, restricting the sample to contain only countries and days with full con-
tact tracing as a consistent testing strategy does not change the results. The results are available
upon request.
As explained in Section 2, a decrease in mobility and activity, due to the stricter restrictions,
does not necessarily reduce the growth of the deaths due to the virus. To understand the effec-
tiveness of decreasing mobility and activity on the contagion, we next report our results from
the three-stage recursive conditional mixed-process (CMP) model described in Eqs (3) to (5).
We use mobility at public transport transit stations for the analysis. Using alternative measures
of mobility, except for mobility around parks, produces similar results. The results are pre-
sented in Table 8, with its coefficients plot in Fig 4 presented below. From the table, comparing
the coefficients in column (1) with column (3), column (2) with column (4), column (5) with
column (7), and column (6) with column (8), it is clear that the decrease in mobility had a
larger effect in more developed countries that are more equal, have less poverty, are more edu-
cated, less polluted with better health infrastructure and governance. For example, a unit
decrease in mobility in countries with more than the median score for the Corruption Percep-
tion Index (cleaner countries) causes a 0.0014 unit decrease in the growth of confirmed cases
to tests ratio. The corresponding figure for countries with less than the median score for the
Corruption Perception Index is insignificant and close to zero. With relatively few exceptions,
the results suggest that developed countries benefited more from a reduction in mobility, in
containing the growth rate of cases to tests ratio, than developing countries. This result is con-
sistent with Barnett-Howell and Mobarak (2020) [53] who also report much lower estimated
benefits of social distancing and social suppression in low-income countries. However, as
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Table 6. Heterogenous impact of stricter restrictions on growth rates 1.
VARIABLES (1) Cases:Tests (2) Deaths:Tests (3) Cases:Tests (4) Deaths:Tests
< Median > Median
Population Density
Stringency Index (Lag 14) -0.0014��� -0.0034��� -0.0010��� -0.0031���
(0.0002) (0.0011) (0.0003) (0.0007)
Observations 4,645 4,210 5,894 5,415
Number of country 36 35 44 43
Mean of DV 0.010 0.019 0.003 0.016
F-Stat 97.807 127.964 41.231 30.538
Primary Education
Stringency Index (Lag 14) -0.0005 -0.0012��� -0.0012��� -0.0034���
(0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0007)
Observations 2,995 2,734 7,544 6,891
Number of country 24 24 56 54
Mean of DV 0.012 0.020 0.004 0.017
F-Stat 380.081 244.774 65.763 51.179
Poverty Head Count
Stringency Index (Lag 14) -0.0012��� -0.0027��� -0.0004 -0.0025��
(0.0002) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0012)
Observations 6,171 5,717 4,368 3,908
Number of country 45 44 35 34
Mean of DV 0.003 0.017 0.010 0.017
F-Stat 68.893 51.402 15.161 8.016
Gini Index
Stringency Index (Lag 14) -0.0014��� -0.0030��� -0.0007��� -0.0025���
(0.0002) (0.0007) (0.0003) (0.0009)
Observations 5,321 4,825 5,218 4,800
Number of country 39 38 41 40
Mean of DV 0.003 0.020 0.009 0.015
F-Stat 48.890 38.987 29.206 17.008
Age 65 & Older
Stringency Index (Lag 14) -0.0005 -0.0025��� -0.0013��� -0.0027���
(0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0002) (0.0007)
Observations 3,688 3,240 6,851 6,385
Number of country 29 28 51 50
Mean of DV 0.008 0.015 0.005 0.019
F-Stat 179.510 159.559 47.027 36.699
PM2.5
Stringency Index (Lag 14) -0.0015��� -0.0035��� -0.0004 -0.0020���
(0.0002) (0.0008) (0.0003) (0.0005)
Observations 6,416 6,110 4,123 3,515
Number of country 48 48 32 30
Mean of DV 0.004 0.018 0.009 0.017
F-Stat 59.872 48.921 23.656 11.577
Fixed Effects Country; Days since first case
Robust standard errors clustered at the country level.
� p < 0.10;
�� p < 0.05;
��� p< 0.01.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0253348.t006
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Table 7. Heterogenous impact of stricter restrictions on growth rates 2.
VARIABLES (1) Cases:Tests (2) Deaths:Tests (3) Cases:Tests (4) Deaths:Tests
< Median > Median
Corruption Perception Index
Stringency Index (Lag 14) -0.0007 -0.0023� -0.0012��� -0.0029���
(0.0005) (0.0013) (0.0002) (0.0006)
Observations 3,455 3,086 7,084 6,539
Number of country 27 26 53 52
Mean of DV 0.013 0.018 0.002 0.017
F-Stat 69.604 156.242 58.097 48.078
Democracy Score
Stringency Index (Lag 14) -0.0004 -0.0027��� -0.0014��� -0.0043���
(0.0004) (0.0008) (0.0002) (0.0006)
Observations 3,424 2,825 7,115 6,800
Number of country 27 25 53 53
Mean of DV 0.010 0.019 0.004 0.017
F-Stat 73.911 99.776 49.927 43.538
Government Effectiveness
Stringency Index (Lag 14) -0.0007 -0.0022��� -0.0012��� -0.0065���
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0002) (0.0015)
Observations 3,854 3,441 6,685 6,184
Number of country 30 29 50 49
Mean of DV 0.012 0.019 0.002 0.017
F-Stat 40.093 35.216 58.578 44.686
Hospital Beds per 100k
Stringency Index (Lag 14) -0.0006�� -0.0026��� -0.0012��� -0.0026���
(0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0002) (0.0007)
Observations 3,895 3,528 6,644 6,097
Number of country 30 29 50 49
Mean of DV 0.010 0.015 0.003 0.018
F-Stat 210.199 181.536 57.133 44.644
Handwashing Facilities
Stringency Index (Lag 14) -0.0001 -0.0023�� -0.0011��� -0.0030���
(0.0004) (0.0010) (0.0002) (0.0006)
Observations 1,648 1,429 8,891 8,196
Number of country 13 13 67 65
Mean of DV 0.010 0.018 0.005 0.017
F-Stat 369.736 211.754 66.703 48.252
Cardiovascular Diseases Death Rate
Stringency Index (Lag 14) -0.0013��� -0.0044��� -0.0008�� -0.0027���
(0.0002) (0.0007) (0.0003) (0.0012)
Observations 6,214 5,958 4,325 3,667
Number of country 47 47 33 31
Mean of DV 0.005 0.017 0.007 0.017
F-Stat 37.084 31.917 113.928 123.627
Fixed Effects Country; Days since first case
Robust standard errors clustered at the country level.
� p < 0.10;
�� p < 0.05;
��� p< 0.01.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0253348.t007
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Fig 4 visually shows, we do not find such stark differences across the heterogeneity dimensions
in the case of deaths to tests ratio, where education, democracy, and government effectiveness
seem to play a dominant role. The results remain consistent when restricting the sample to
only countries and dates with full contact tracing as a consistent testing strategy, and are
reported in S8 Table in S1 Appendix.
The heterogeneity results provide some elucidation to the possible reasons. Given that the
population, on average, in relatively less-developed countries is more immunocompromised,
fewer people might have been able to fight off the infections. There is a growing amount of sci-
entific evidence that points towards people with better immune systems being able to fight
SARS-CoV-2 infection better. See, for example [54]. People who can fight off the viral infection
are possibly being less diagnosed, due to a shorter incubation period. Stringency measures are
unable to counter immunodeficiency. This is further aggravated by the fact that stringent
mobility measures lower the spread of the disease at the cost of people’s economic opportuni-
ties. With higher poverty rates in developing countries, poor people may place greater value
on their livelihoods relative to contracting the infection. The reduction in economic activity
due to the restrictions could directly affect the daily consumption of poorer people, further
compromising their immune systems. Similarly, hand-washes are not on the top of the
Fig 3. Coefficient plots of hetegeneous impact of stricter restriction on growth rates. Coefficient plots are constructed using results from Tables 6 and 7
with 90% confidence intervals.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0253348.g003
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shopping list of poor people, especially during times of economic hardships. The lack of access
to adequate hand-washing facilities might also hinder their ability to combat the virus, even in
the presence of greater stringency.
The idea of instilling mobility restrictions is to flatten the curve and thereby lower the dis-
ease burden on the health infrastructure. However, most less-developed countries have a
limited number of hospital beds and ventilators. If these are already over-whelmed and inac-
cessible, flattening the curve is only marginally useful compared to countries with better and
accessible health infrastructure, and the effect of stringency measures would be, accordingly,
much lower. Furthermore, the higher population density in less-developed countries could
Table 8. Heterogenous impact of transit station mobility on growth rates: Recursive mixed-process model.
VARIABLES (1) Cases:Tests (2) Deaths:Tests (3) Cases:Tests (4) Deaths:Tests (5) Cases:Tests (6) Deaths:Tests (7) Cases:Tests (8) Deaths:Tests
< Median > Median < Median > Median
Population Density Corruption Perception Index
Transit Stations 0.0020��� 0.0052��� 0.0013 0.0045��� 0.0000 0.0039 0.0014��� 0.0041���
(0.0006) (0.0018) (0.0008) (0.0014) (0.0009) (0.0022) (0.0005) (0.0012)
Observations 8,619 8,604 9,356 9,301 7,820 7,806 10,155 10,099
Mean of DV 0.010 0.019 0.003 0.017 0.013 0.018 0.003 0.018
Primary Education Democracy Score
Transit Stations -0.0002 0.0019�� 0.0015�� 0.0058��� -0.0004 0.0037��� 0.0019��� 0.0079���
(0.0013) (0.0009) (0.0006) (0.0011) (0.0007) (0.0011) (0.0005) (0.0013)
Observations 5,518 5,504 12,457 12,401 8,105 8,077 9,870 9,828
Mean of DV 0.011 0.020 0.004 0.017 0.009 0.019 0.005 0.017
Poverty Head Count Government Effectiveness
Transit Stations 0.0017�� 0.0040��� -0.0002 0.0036��� -0.0002 0.0033��� 0.0015��� 0.0081���
(0.0007) (0.0013) (0.0008) (0.0014) (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0005) (0.0015)
Observations 8,290 8,234 9,685 9,671 8,087 8,048 9,888 9,857
Mean of DV 0.004 0.018 0.009 0.017 0.009 0.015 0.004 0.019
Gini Index Hospital Beds per 100k
Transit Stations 0.0018��� 0.0040��� 0.0001 0.0037��� -0.0000 0.0039��� 0.0020��� 0.0040���
(0.0004) (0.0014) (0.0006) (0.0012) (0.0006) (0.0012) (0.0005) (0.0014)
Observations 7,942 7,890 10,033 10,015 8,087 8,048 9,888 9,857
Mean of DV 0.003 0.021 0.009 0.015 0.009 0.015 0.004 0.019
Age 65 & Older Handwashing Facilities
Transit Stations -0.0001 0.0038��� 0.0021��� 0.0047��� -0.0006 0.0038�� 0.0014�� 0.0043���
(0.0005) (0.0010) (0.0005) (0.0014) (0.0006) (0.0018) (0.0006) (0.0012)
Observations 8,662 8,623 9,313 9,282 3,905 3,891 14,070 14,014
Mean of DV 0.007 0.015 0.006 0.019 0.009 0.018 0.006 0.018
PM2.5 Cardiovascular Diseases Death Rate
Transit Stations 0.0021��� 0.0043��� -0.0002 0.0043��� 0.0026��� 0.0072��� 0.0002 0.0046���
(0.0006) (0.0016) (0.0007) (0.0016) (0.0008) (0.0012) (0.0007) (0.0009)
Observations 8,625 8,587 9,350 9,318 9,014 8,983 8,961 8,922
Mean of DV 0.005 0.018 0.009 0.018 0.006 0.018 0.006 0.017
Fixed Effects Country; Days since first case
Robust standard errors clustered at the country level.
� p < 0.10;
�� p < 0.05;
��� p< 0.01.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0253348.t008
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mean a higher rate of human-to-human contact and transfer even with lower mobility than
richer countries. Finally, another reason could be that the poor in the less-developed countries
lack the knowledge of best practices to follow when a person who has tested positive is isolated
either at home or at the hospital. Poorer government effectiveness and more corruption also
mean sluggish enforcement of recommended best practices.
Whatever be the reason(s), one clear inference from the final set of results is that mobility
measures alone were not and will not be sufficient to contain the contagion in developing
countries. What is worse is that on top of the relatively worse performance of a decrease in
mobility in controlling the spread, the economic cost of these restrictions is also higher in
these countries. With weaker institutions, social security support, and reliance on daily wages
for consumption, restrictions on economic activity mean that poorer countries face a catch-22
much worse than the richer countries. Finding a solution could be difficult without external
support to implement complementary measures.
4 Conclusion
Some have claimed that governments across the world have responded slowly and insuffi-
ciently to the COVID-19 pandemic [55]. Others have highlighted the real threats of stricter
restrictions [56]. It is, therefore, imperative to understand how effective the restrictions
Fig 4. Coefficient plots of hetegeneous impact of transit station mobility on growth rates: Recursive mixed-process model. Coefficient plots are
constructed using results from Table 8 with 90% confidence intervals.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0253348.g004
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implemented by the countries across the world are. Compared to earlier evaluations of these
restrictions that document a strong negative association between the stringency of the restric-
tions and the spread of the disease, we use an instrumental variable approach to estimate the
causal effect of the restrictions.
We find that while the restrictions implemented affected mobility and the spread of the dis-
ease, there was considerable heterogeneity across countries. While stricter measures reduce
mobility more in less-developed countries, they do not contain the contagion as effectively as
they do in developed countries. Thus, it would seem less-developed countries with weaker
institutions have less to gain from stricter mobility restrictions. This could result from the
lower levels of awareness, poorer health conditions and practices, and worse economic condi-
tions in these countries. The results highlight the need to complement restriction policies with
awareness, economic, and health assistance schemes.
It is, however, unclear what these complementary policies could be. From direct monetary
help to only partial shutdowns, there is a range of policies to choose from. Future research
should investigate the effectiveness of these alternative complementary policies in increasing
the effectiveness of the mobility and activity restrictions in developing nations.
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